Partnership patterns in the United States and across Europe: the role of education and country context by Perelli-Harris, Brienna & Lyons-Amos, Mark
  
Brienna Perelli-Harris and Mark Lyons-Amos 
Partnership patterns in the United States and 
across Europe: the role of education and 
country context 
 
Article (Published version) 
Refereed 
 Original citation: 
Perelli-Harris, Brienna and Lyons-Amos, Mark (2016) Partnership patterns in the United States 
and across Europe: the role of education and country context. Social Forces, 95 (1). pp. 251-
282. ISSN 0037-7732 
 
DOI: 10.1093/sf/sow054  
 
Reuse of this item is permitted through licensing under the Creative Commons: 
 
© 2016 The Authors 
CC BY-NC 4.0 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/69498/  
 
Available in LSE Research Online: February 2017 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. You may freely distribute the URL 
(http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website.  
 
 
 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Partnership Patterns in the United States and across Europe
Partnership Patterns in the United States and across
Europe: The Role of Education and Country Context
Brienna Perelli-Harris, University of Southampton
Mark Lyons-Amos, London School of Economics and Political Science
Patterns of partnership formation and dissolution are changing dramaticallyacross the Western world. Some scholars have argued that women’s trajecto-ries of union formation and dissolution are diverging by education, with the
higher educated postponing but eventually marrying and the lower educated more
likely to cohabit or divorce if they do marry. At the same time, the variation in partner-
ship behavior has also increased across countries, suggesting that country context
plays an important role. Here, we use latent class growth models to compare the
educational gradient of partnership trajectories in the United States and 14 countries
in Europe and investigate the role of education and country context. Our results indi-
cate a consistent positive educational gradient for partnership patterns showing the
postponement of marriage, regardless of whether marriage was preceded by cohab-
itation, but a less consistent gradient for patterns reﬂecting long-term cohabitation
and union dissolution. Although the US results show evidence of an educational
divergence in marriage and union dissolution, the evidence from the other countries
is weak. In addition, country context explains more of the variation in class member-
ship than education, with context becoming more important over time. The diver-
gence in behaviors across country contexts suggests that social, cultural, political,
and economic developments are essential for understanding changes in partnership
formation and dissolution.
Patterns of partnership formation and dissolution are changing dramatically
across the Western world: marriage is being postponed, divorce is increasing,
and cohabitation is now an alternative living arrangement for unmarried adults
(Sobotka and Toulemon 2008; Kennedy and Bumpass 2008). Some scholars
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have argued that trajectories of union formation and dissolution are diverging
by education, with the higher educated postponing but eventually marrying and
the lower educated more likely to cohabit or divorce if they do marry
(McLanahan 2004; Cherlin 2009; Isen and Stevenson 2010; Martin 2006). The
evidence for these arguments is primarily from the United States, where eco-
nomic inequality has been increasing (McLanahan and Percheski 2008), but also
from other countries such as Australia and New Zealand (Heard 2011). While
evidence from some countries in Europe indicates that the educational gradient
for having a birth within cohabitation is negative (Perelli-Harris et al. 2010), the
evidence for union trajectories as a whole is scant. Indeed, the association
between education and analyses of individual events (e.g., divorce, marriage,
and cohabitation) differs across countries and over time (Härkönen and
Dronkers 2006; Kalmijn 2013; Matysiak, Styrc, and Vignoli 2013; Neels and
Perelli-Harris 2013). Thus, it is not clear that the association between patterns
of partnership formation and education is universal or can be generalized to
other industrialized countries.
In addition, levels of union formation and dissolution have not been increas-
ing uniformly across countries and instead appear to be diverging (Billari and
Liefbroer 2010). The proportion that has ever married is higher in Southern
Europe than in Northern Europe, while the proportion that has ever cohabited
is higher in Northern Europe compared to Southern Europe (Neels and Perelli-
Harris 2013; Sobotka and Toulemon 2008). The median age at marriage varies
from around 22 in parts of Eastern Europe to over 31 in Northern Europe
(Billari and Liefbroer 2010). The percentage of women who ever experienced
union dissolution ranges from less than 10 percent in Southern and some
Eastern European countries to over 40 percent in Norway and the United States
(Galezewska, Perelli-Harris, and Berrington 2013). This divergence in behaviors
across countries suggests that the social, cultural, political, and economic con-
text is essential for understanding changes in partnership formation and
dissolution.
Thus, although an individual’s education may be key to understanding
changes in certain aspects of union formation or in certain countries, it is
not clear that trajectories are diverging by education everywhere. In this
paper, we examine the following main research questions: How do the edu-
cational gradients for patterns of partnership formation differ across
Europe and the United States and over time? Are certain partnership pat-
terns more likely to be consistently associated with education than others?
In addition, country of residence appears to be very salient for understand-
ing new developments in union formation. Thus, we also investigate to what
extent both country context and individual-level education play a role in
union formation.
To answer these questions, we study the association between women’s educa-
tion and holistic partnership trajectories using latent class growth models
(LCGM). Most studies of union formation and education model only single
events, which show the association with a particular type of union behavior, but
do not show how education is associated with partnership trajectories as a
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whole. Given that partnership behavior has become much more complex and
de-standardized, with individuals experiencing cohabitation, union dissolu-
tion, and multiple partnerships (Perelli-Harris and Lyons-Amos 2015; Elizinga
and Liefbroer 2007), studying a single event at a time does not show the total
association between education and partnership behavior across the lifecourse.
Thus, it is necessary to examine holistic partnership trajectories to show how
education is associated with partnership formation and dissolution across the
lifecourse.
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, by using latent
class growth models, it presents an innovative way of modeling partnership for-
mation by simultaneously examining the timing, sequencing, and quantum of
events. Although previous studies in demography have used this method (e.g.,
Dariotis et al. 2011), they have rarely been used for comparing family formation
across multiple countries and with large datasets. Second, the study examines to
what extent the association between partnership patterns and education is simi-
lar across countries. These ﬁndings contrast the United States with Europe and
provide insights into whether the underlying reasons for family change are uni-
versal. Third, the study assesses the relative contribution of education and coun-
try to the probability of membership in a given class. This provides evidence for
the role of both individual-level education and country-speciﬁc context.
Theoretical Framework
Education and Partnership Patterns
With the decline in marriage and rise in divorce throughout the 1970s and
1980s, economic and ideational theories posited that the increase in women’s
education was responsible for the spread of new behaviors (Becker 1991; van de
Kaa 1987; Lesthaeghe 2010). Highly educated women’s economic independence
allowed them to live outside marriage and divorce if they did marry (Becker
1991). Now oriented toward autonomy and career, more educated women
rejected the patriarchal institution of marriage in favor of more ﬂexible arrange-
ments such as cohabitation. If they did marry, their opposition to traditional
institutions such as the Church would lead them to be more likely to divorce and
repartner in cohabiting unions (Lesthaeghe 2010).
Several recent explanations, however, have tended to stress that women’s
higher education is beneﬁcial to marriage and protects against divorce
(Oppenheimer 1988; Oppenheimer 1997; Goldstein and Kenney 2001; Sweeney
2002; McLanahan 2004; Cherlin 2009; Perelli-Harris et al. 2010). Higher edu-
cated women may postpone marriage, but as their economic potential becomes
more similar to men’s, they become more attractive to prospective spouses,
which results in higher marriage rates compared to their less educated counter-
parts (Oppenheimer 1997; Sweeney 2002; Goldstein and Kenney 2001). In addi-
tion, the resources that highly educated women bring to the union reduce risk
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and stabilize marriage, resulting in lower divorce rates (Oppenheimer 1997;
Matysiak, Styrc, and Vignoli 2013).
Many of these shifts have been the result of widespread social and economic
developments that have altered the institution of marriage, thereby facilitating
the gains to marriage for highly educated women (Cherlin 2009; Stevenson and
Wolfers 2007). In many industrialized countries, marriage now appears to be
shifting away from a dependent, patriarchal relationship toward a more egalitar-
ian partnership with both partners contributing to the relationship (Heard 2011;
Kalmijn 2013). Changes in lifestyles have led marriage to be advantageous for
those who complement each other, rather than those who specialize in different
domains (Stevenson and Wolfers 2007). In addition, new labor-market demands
and middle-class aspirations have resulted in many choosing a dual-earner
model, which often beneﬁts those with greater economic potential. Having a
higher shared income allows the couple to maintain a higher standard of living
and protect against unemployment or illness, resulting in increased relationship
stability.
In the United States, the emerging positive educational gradient of marriage
(Isen and Stevenson 2010) has led some researchers to claim that marriage is
becoming a status symbol reserved for the economic elite (Cherlin 2009).
Increases in income inequality have made it even more difﬁcult for low-educated
couples to achieve the standard of living perceived necessary for marriage
(McLanahan and Percheski 2008). Qualitative studies from the United States
also indicate that low-income couples would like to marry, but often lack the
ﬁnancial stability to do so (Reed 2006; Gibson-Davis 2007; Smock, Manning,
and Porter 2005). In addition, low-income couples who do marry face a greater
risk of divorce, due to strains brought about by employment instability and job
loss (Edin and Kefalas 2005).
The corollary to this argument is that in places with a high economic bar for
marriage, couples who are not ready or able to marry live in cohabitation.
Couples with weak economic prospects—usually the least educated—are most
likely to cohabit (Oppenheimer 2003; Kalmijn 2011). Studies from the United
States show that the least educated do not have the ﬁnancial or emotional
resources to convert their cohabiting relationships into marriage, and instead
ﬁnd themselves cohabiting or cycling through multiple partnerships (Kennedy
and Bumpass 2008; Lichter, Turner, and Sassler 2010). Thus, even though cou-
ples of all educational levels increasingly begin their relationships with cohabita-
tion, as relationships progress and individuals reach later adulthood, the more
highly educated are most likely to marry. This results in a negative educational
gradient for cohabitation, especially by the time of the ﬁrst birth (Perelli-Harris
et al. 2010). In addition, given that cohabiting unions are more likely to dissolve
(Heuveline, Timberlake, and Furstenberg 2003; Galezewska, Perelli-Harris, and
Berrington 2013), the least educated are more likely to experience the dissolu-
tion not only of their marriages, but also of their cohabiting unions.
Although a great body of literature in the United States provides evidence for
a positive educational gradient for marriage and a negative educational gradient
for cohabitation and divorce (see McLanahan and Percheski 2008; Carlson and
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England 2011), the ﬁndings in Europe are more inconsistent and depend on type
of transition, time period analyzed, and method of measurement. In most coun-
tries, higher education leads to the postponement of marriage (Goldstein and
Kenney 2001; Coppola 2004; Kalmijn 2007), and the increase in the age at mar-
riage is correlated with the expansion of education (Sobotka and Toulemon
2008). The association with ever marrying or staying married, however, is less
consistent (Kalmijn 2013). The educational gradient for the percent of women
who have ever cohabited is mixed (Neels and Perelli-Harris 2013) and may
depend on the point in the lifecourse analyzed (Mikolai, Perelli-Harris, and
Berrington 2014). Thus, it is unclear whether the educational gradient for
cohabitation and the transition to marriage is consistent across the lifecourse.
Likewise, the evidence for the relationship between education and divorce is
mixed. In the United States, the educational gradient of divorce has reversed
from positive to negative (Martin 2006). In Europe, the educational gradient for
divorce appears to switch as the prevalence of divorce increases; the gradient is
positive in countries where divorce has just begun to emerge and negative in
countries where divorce is more common (Härkönen and Dronkers 2006;
Matysiak, Styrc, and Vignoli 2013). This reversal may be due to changes in the
costs of divorce: when the social and economic costs of divorce are high, only
highly educated women have the resources to divorce, but when the costs
decline, the least educated may be more likely to divorce (Härkönen and
Dronkers 2006). Nonetheless, it is unclear whether this reversal occurs every-
where, especially given the lack of a strong relationship between education and
divorce in some countries.
Country Context and Partnership Patterns
Although social and economic change may be leading to different partnership
trajectories by education, the role of country has also been found to be one of
the most enduring factors shaping family formation. Numerous studies have
found that countries, or states deﬁned by national borders, have been important
for deﬁning demographic processes across space (e.g., Klüsener, Perelli-Harris,
and Sánchez Gassen 2013; Coale and Watkins 1986). By developing standard
policies, education, communication, and media, the modern state has organized
and structured populations, resulting in greater homogenization of behaviors
within countries (Watkins 1991). Country borders continue to be important for
deﬁning behaviors, such as levels of nonmarital fertility (Klüsener, Perelli-
Harris, and Sánchez Gassen 2013). Countries delineate the space in which peo-
ple are exposed to economic, social, political, and cultural factors, which in turn
inﬂuence individual behaviors that aggregate to population-level behavior.
Social change also does not happen randomly in space, but is generally con-
centrated within the borders of countries. Within countries, underlying cultural
propensities and historical kinship systems (Reher 1998) coupled with social
and political developments led to the diffusion of new ideas and the practice of
new behaviors (Lesthaeghe and Neels 2002). Some populations adopt new beha-
viors quickly, while others maintain traditional behaviors for decades. For
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example, cohabitation and divorce have only recently started to increase in
Southern Europe, due to the persistence of “strong family ties” (Reher 1998).
Catholicism has slowed the diffusion of cohabitation and divorce in Italy,
Poland, and Lithuania (Vignoli and Salvini 2014; Mynarska and Bernardi 2007;
Katus et al. 2007). On the other hand, Protestantism may have promoted liberal
values in countries such as Estonia (Katus et al. 2007) and other Nordic coun-
tries. In general, the Nordic countries experienced an earlier orientation toward
gender equality and female participation in the labor force (Bernhardt, Noack,
and Lyngstad 2008), which facilitated women’s independence and potentially
led to the increase in cohabitation and divorce. However, much of Western
Germany also has Protestant roots and cohabitation has continued to remain
low, due to a persistent conservative orientation toward motherhood and the
breadwinner model (Konietzka and Kreyenfeld 2002). Thus, the factors inﬂu-
encing family behavior and facilitating changes in family behavior cannot be
decanted down to one factor, but instead are multifaceted and complex.
In addition, globalized processes of change may interact with local conditions
to produce speciﬁc effects. Although the emergence of feminism and individuali-
zation may have been important for liberalizing attitudes across countries, glob-
alization of labor markets throughout the 1980s and 1990s may have produced
uncertainty that led to postponed marriage or temporary relationships (Mills
and Blossfeld 2005; Perelli-Harris et al. 2010). Yet, the impact of uncertainty
may have different effects on union formation in different countries. For exam-
ple, youth unemployment and temporary employment have been linked to the
postponement of marriage with low premarital cohabitation in Spain (Castro-
Martin, Domínguez-Folgueras, and Martín-García 2008), while economic
uncertainty has been associated with higher levels of cohabitation and nonmari-
tal fertility in Eastern Germany (Konietzka and Kreyenfeld 2002). Economic
insecurity also interacted with rapid social change in the post-socialist world, for
example, by producing a pattern of disadvantage for childbearing in cohabita-
tion in Russia (Perelli-Harris and Gerber 2011). Thus, ideational change coupled
with changes in economic conditions has led to new patterns of union formation
behavior and raised questions about whether previous theories of marriage are
adequate for explaining these new developments.
Along with cultural and economic developments, policies and legal systems
are also important for understanding the variation in partnership behaviors
across countries. Historical and cultural developments led to variation in the
rights and responsibilities provided to married and cohabiting couples, which
may in turn be related to the choices couples make about whether to marry or
divorce (Perelli-Harris and Sánchez Gassen 2012). For example, the enactment
of divorce laws, especially those that allowed divorce without the consent of
one’s spouse, led to short-term increases in divorce, although these increases
may have been the result of pent-up demand rather than long-term effect (Kneip
and Bauer 2009). Nonetheless, divorce laws can reﬂect and reinforce cross-
national differentials in divorce. Likewise, laws on cohabitation and marriage
differ considerably across Europe; some countries, such as the Netherlands and
Norway, have equalized many laws on cohabitation and marriage, while others,
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such as Germany, Switzerland, Lithuania, and Russia, continue to maintain dis-
tinctions between marriage and cohabitation, especially in tax law (Perelli-Harris
and Sánchez Gassen 2012; Sánchez Gassen and Perelli-Harris 2015). Different
legal regimes may shape choices about marriage and cohabitation, although the
correlation is far from perfect (Sánchez Gassen and Perelli-Harris 2015).
Finally, certain factors may mediate the relationship between education and
union formation. The diffusion of a behavior may result in the reversal of the
educational gradient, as seen with divorce (Matysiak, Styrc, and Vignoli 2013;
Härkönen and Dronkers 2006). The development of new values such as gender
equality in some countries may be associated with a positive educational gradient
for marriage (Kalmijn 2013). Nonetheless, while gender equality may be impor-
tant for inﬂuencing the educational gradient of marriage, we do not know
whether an individual’s education or country context matters more for determin-
ing overall trajectories of union formation. Given the persistent and dynamic
effects of culture, economic conditions, and policy context, as well as the effects of
individual-level education on speciﬁc partnership transitions, it is important to
examine the relative contribution of one’s own education and country context.
Data
To answer our two main research questions, we analyze retrospective union and
fertility histories from 15 surveys that have been standardized in a dataset called
the Harmonized Histories (Perelli-Harris, Kreyenfeld, and Kubisch 2010;
and see www.nonmarital.org). We focus on women, because the union histories
for men are not available in all countries. The data for Austria, Belgium,
Bulgaria, Estonia, France, Italy, Lithuania, Norway, Romania, and Russia come
from the Generations and Gender Surveys (GGS), which interviewed nationally
representative samples of the resident population in each country. These surveys
broadly reﬂect vital registration indicators for marriage (Vergauwen et al.
2015). Because the GGS is not available for all countries, we also employed
other data sources. The Dutch data come from the 2003 Fertility and Family
Survey (FFS). The data for the UK are from the British Household Panel Survey
(BHPS). The Spanish data come from the Survey of Fertility and Values con-
ducted in 2006, and the Polish data are from the Employment, Family, and
Education survey conducted in 2006. The US data are from two rounds of the
National Survey of Family Growth, conducted in 1995 and between 2006 and
2008. Table 1 shows the number of women aged 15–45 in each survey by educa-
tion and cohort for the analysis sample.
Despite slightly different survey designs, the union histories are relatively
comparable. Our data include the month of entrance into cohabiting and marital
unions as well as separation and divorce. Questions about cohabitation gener-
ally refer to co-resident relationships with an intimate partner that last more
than three months. Our analysis examines the relationship states that occur
between the ages of 15 and 45. However, because most of our surveys inter-
viewed women who were older than 45 at the time of the survey, we compare
women born in 1945–54, 1955–64, and 1965–74. In Austria and Poland, only
Partnership Patterns in the United States and across Europe 257
Table 1. Distribution of Educational Attainment in Each Country by Cohort before Weighting
(frequencies in parentheses)
Birth cohort
Country
Educational
level 1945–54 1955–64 1965–74
Austria GGSa Low 18.8 (31) 14.3 (158)
Medium 66.0 (109) 65.4 (737)
High 15.1 (25) 20.3 (229)
Belgium GGS Low 41.3 (185) 29.9 (169) 14.7 (68)
Medium 28.1 (126) 35.1 (198) 37.3 (174)
High 30.4 (136) 34.9 (197) 47.9 (231)
Bulgaria GGS Low 25.6 (195) 17.3 (195) 14.1 (207)
Medium 50.5 (384) 55.2 (623) 55.3 (810)
High 35.6 (181) 27.4 (309) 30.5 (461)
Estonia GGS Low 13.9 (119) 6.3 (56) 8.2 (71)
Medium 50.4 (429) 49.7 (438) 55.1 (440)
High 35.6 (303) 43.8 (385) 36.6 (289)
France GGS Low 44.0 (349) 29.9 (218) 17.7 (136)
Medium 36.9 (293) 40.5 (295) 44.3 (342)
High 19.0 (151) 29.4 (215) 37.9 (304)
Italy GGS Low 66.6 (2209) 49.5 (1740) 41.0 (1166)
Medium 24.2 (804) 40.2 (1417) 47.1 (1361)
High 9.1 (302) 10.1 (357) 11.8 (336)
Lithuania GGS Low 11.6 (67) 3.1 (21) 4.5 (31)
Medium 66.8 (384) 67.5 (511) 68.1 (463)
High 21.6 (124) 29.3 (221) 27.3 (186)
Netherlands FFS Low 51.9 (489) 39.4 (425) 25.2 (248)
Medium 30.7 (289) 38.6 (418) 50.9 (507)
High 17.3 (163) 21.9 (237) 23.7 (237)
Norway GGS Low 16.2 (195) 21.8 (280) 11.8 (171)
Medium 49.2 (590) 41.1 (528) 37.1 (541)
High 34.5 (414) 37.0 (475) 51.0 (752)
Poland EFESa Low 42.4 (586)
Medium 36.5 (505)
High 20.9 (291)
Romania GGS Low 54.4 (630) 31.1 (288) 28.3 (310)
Medium 37.6 (436) 57.5 (535) 61.0 (667)
High 7.9 (92) 11.3 (106) 10.5 (116)
(Continued)
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women up to age 49 were interviewed; thus, we include only one or two cohorts
from these surveys. In the US NSFG, only women up to age 44 were interviewed;
thus, the 1995 NSFG allows us to examine only the 1951–54 cohorts, while the
2006–08 NSFG allows us to examine the 1955–64 and 1965–74 cohorts.
Although the Harmonized Histories surveys are relatively comparable, each
survey’s sampling strategy and response rates differ, which can have different
implications for the creation of the latent classes. Some surveys do not require
weights (for example, Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania), while some surveys
include sample weights at the individual level (Austria, France, US), or both the
household and individual level (UK). Since our inference regards individual-level
behaviors, we apply the individual-level weights where relevant. Where unavail-
able, we use a constant as the individual-level weight. In addition, some surveys
(i.e., Italy) have very large samples, which may dominate the results in a pooled
dataset. To analyze the pooled dataset, we have transformed the weighting
schemes to retain their internal consistency, but also provide meaningful cross-
national solutions. To create a sample with each survey equally represented, we
rescale the weighted population totals so that each survey contributes the same
proportion to the total sample. This approach allows the internal validity of the
surveys to be maintained (all the weights are adjusted), but ensures that no one
survey dominates the sample.
Table 1. continued
Birth cohort
Country
Educational
level 1945–54 1955–64 1965–74
Russia GGS Low 8.6 (99) 2.3 (33) 3.3 (35)
Medium 68.9 (792) 75.6 (1031) 73.1 (747)
High 22.3 (257) 22.0 (302) 23.5 (239)
Spain SFS Low 75.8 (723) 53.7 (716) 37.2 (506)
Medium 15.9 (152) 29.0 (390) 39.9 (551)
High 8.1 (78) 17.2 (230) 22.8 (318)
UK BHPS Low 26.3 (201) 12.1 (105) 6.2 (56)
Medium 15.9 (239) 34.9 (304) 37.7 (341)
High 42.3 (323) 52.9 (460) 56.0 (551)
US NSFG Low 12.9 (211b) 12.5 (496b) 16.5 (317c)
Medium 37.5 (612b) 40.8 (1596b) 26.0 (495c)
High 49.5 (809b) 46.6 (1832b) 57.3 (1094c)
aHistories were not collected for the 1945–54 birth cohort in the Austrian GGS and the 1945–54
and 1955–64 birth cohorts in the Poland EFES.
bData are from 1995 National Survey of Family Growth and refer to the 1951–54 cohorts.
cData are from the 2006–08 National Survey of Family Growth and refer to the 1955–64 and
1965–74 cohorts.
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Methods
We use a two-stage process to answer our two main research questions: 1) We
answer the ﬁrst research question by using latent classes as the dependent vari-
able in a multinomial logit model with education and country included as
explanatory variables. 2) We answer the second research question by showing
the relative contribution of education compared to country context in inﬂuenc-
ing the probability of latent class membership.
LCGM Models
Latent class growth curve models (LCGM), which are the dependent variable in
our analyses, trace partnership patterns for each individual and then cluster the
patterns into latent classes.1 To create the growth curves, we ﬁrst expand the
data into person-years.2 We then ﬁt separate trajectories for each union status:
never in union, cohabiting, directly married, married having previously cohab-
ited, and single after being in a previous union.3 We distinguish between directly
marrying and marrying after cohabiting to show how entrance into marriage
changes over time. This approach reveals to what extent cohabitation is emerg-
ing as a precursor to marriage or as a long-term relationship that lasts until the
respondent is 45.
The response variable for the model is deﬁned as the random variable yi,
which is deﬁned at each year of the respondent’s partnership history.
⎧
⎨
⎪⎪⎪
⎩
⎪⎪⎪
=y s
Never in a union
Cohabiting
Married preceded by coabitation
Directly married
Single after separation
0
1
2
3
4
i age,
Respondents switch between these different states as they move along the life-
course from ages 15 to 45. A respondent can move between these mutually
exclusive states; for example, if she marries at age 20, divorces at 25, cohabits at
28, and then remarries at 30, she would be in the states never in union, directly
married, single after being in a previous union, cohabiting, and married having
previously cohabited. We were unable to model higher-order partnerships
directly due to small sample size that distorted the LCGM results. If two of these
partnerships are present within the same year, the higher-value state is selected
(for example, if cohabitation transitions to marriage in the same year, the year is
classiﬁed as =y 2ij rather than 1). In certain circumstances, the selection of high-
er states will lead to the truncation of a relationship, for instance if a relationship
starts during the same year as a separation. In order to avoid missing relation-
ships, we overwrite years classiﬁed as separation with the new relationship sta-
tus, although again these relationships may be truncated. As a result, periods of
separation lasting less than one year could be missed. However, sensitivity
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analyses comparing multiple approaches show that the underestimation does
not bias our results.
We then use Mplus (Muthén and Muthén 2011) to calculate growth
equations that describe different trajectories. Trajectories are combined to form
each latent class, which describe different partnership patterns across the life-
course. Each woman has a probability of being in each latent class; the more
closely her observed partnership history is to the class trajectories, the higher the
probability of class membership. The probability of being in partnership s at a
given age is deﬁned as π = ( = )Pr y sis i age, (see Equation 1). i indexes the individ-
ual woman. The probability of partnerships across the lifecourse is modeled as a
growth equation, where yi age, is a function of age and age
2.4 A separate growth
equation is speciﬁed for each classCj, where j indexes the class and there are 1…J
classes. For logit estimation, we set direct marriage as the reference category.
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In Equation 1, the class-speciﬁc intercept is described by αjs, while the class-
speciﬁc growth curve is described by β js1, and β js2, . All three of these parameters
vary depending on membership in a particular class. In Equation 1, the trajecto-
ries differ only according to class membership,Cj.
5
We use the Lo-Mendell-Rubin Likelihood Ratio Test (LMR-LRT; Lo,
Mendell, and Rubin 2001) to determine the number of classes (Nylund,
Asparouhov, and Muthén 2007). The LMR-LRT is similar to conventional like-
lihood ratio tests that interpret p-values below a certain threshold as indicative
of an improvement in model ﬁt, where the p-value is adjusted to reﬂect the fact
that the likelihood does not follow a chi-square distribution.6 The LMR-LRT
p-values indicate that eight classes optimally ﬁt the pooled data; the addition of
an eighth class improves model ﬁt at the 1 percent level (LMR p-value is below
0.01), but the addition of a ninth class is not signiﬁcant.7
Figure 1 shows the eight latent class trajectories extracted from the model.
The area under the curve represents the probability of being in a relationship
state at a given age between the ages of 15 and 45. The solid line shows the
probability of being never partnered; the dash-dot-dash line represents the prob-
ability of being in cohabitation that does not transition to marriage before
age 45; the small dotted line represents the probability of having a direct mar-
riage; the medium dashed line represents the probability of being in a marriage
that was preceded by cohabitation; and the gray dashed line represents the prob-
ability of being single after having separated from a previous relationship.
Women can transfer between states at any point; for example, a woman may be
never married, then directly marry, spend some time single after marital dissolu-
tion, and then transfer back into cohabitation or marriage for higher-order
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Figure 1. Latent classes based on models of growth trajectories
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unions. Repartnering is incorporated into cohabitation, premarital cohabitation,
or marriage lines.8
The classes and their sensitivity to robustness checks have been discussed in
detail in Perelli-Harris and Lyons-Amos (2015); therefore, we only brieﬂy
describe them here. The ﬁrst four classes primarily reﬂect marriages unlikely to
end in separation by age 45: classes 1 and 2 include only direct marriage, while
classes 3 and 4 reﬂect marriage preceded by cohabitation. Classes 1 and 3 show
patterns of marriage that occur relatively early—the marriage trajectory starts to
increase in the teens and peaks by age 25. Classes 2 and 4, on the other hand,
reﬂect later marriage; in class 2, direct marriage starts shortly after age 20 and
peaks in the late 20s, while in class 4, cohabitation peaks in the mid-20s, with
marriage following in the late 20s. Class 5 reﬂects delayed partnership forma-
tion, with a strong increase in cohabitation occurring after age 30, some mar-
riage in the late 30s, as well as those people who were unlikely to experience
partnerships before age 45.
Classes 6 and 7 reﬂect partnership patterns dominated by separation and
repartnering. Class 6 shows a strong increase in direct marriage in the 20s that
peaks around age 25 and a gradual increase in being single after separation until
over 60 percent of women are predicted to be single after separation. Some of
the women in this class reentered cohabitation or marriage in their 30s. Class 7
starts out with cohabitation followed by marriage, but the class is dominated by
a strong trend in single after separation. Although the probability of direct mar-
riage is low, the majority of women in this class are expected to remain single
after separation into their 30s and 40s. Finally, class 8 is characterized by cohab-
itation with a small uptick in being single after separated. Note that the cohab-
itation class is not identical to the marriage classes, since it shows a
strong decline in cohabitation in the 30s, due to transitions into marriage or
dissolution.
Multinomial Regression Model
Once we have created the latent classes, we allocate respondents to a class based
on their posterior probability of class membership and estimate multinomial
regression models in Stata SE 12.9 It is unlikely that women would be misallo-
cated in our analysis, as the classes extracted in our models show excellent deﬁ-
nition based on the class mean posterior membership probability (the lowest is
0.959 for classes 6 and 7). This is expressed as a random variable, ji, where the
probability of class membership for individual i is π = ( = )C jPrij J .We then apply
the following multinomial regression model (Equation 2):
⎛
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In this model, xi is a vector of dummy variables of individual characteristics
(education, birth cohort, and country) and βj is a set of coefﬁcients measuring
their effect on class membership.
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As discussed above, our main variable of interest is individual’s level of edu-
cation, speciﬁed as three categories standardized across countries. Each survey
includes a six-category measure of highest level of education attained by inter-
view based on the International Standardized Classiﬁcation of Education
(ISCED 1997). We collapsed these categories into three basic categories:
low (ISCED 1 & 2—completed basic secondary), medium (ISCED 3 & 4—
completed secondary school and any education beyond secondary education
but less than completed college [including vocational and technical schools]),
and high (ISCED 5 & 6—university degree and higher). We recognize that these
educational categories are crude and have context-speciﬁc meanings, but given
data limitations, they are optimal for comparisons across a large number of
countries. Note that the distribution of respondents by education differs across
countries, with some countries having a much higher proportion of women
with higher education than others (table 1). However, because our intent is to
compare the educational distribution within countries rather than across coun-
tries, these differences are less important.
The multinomial model predicts class membership based on education, birth
cohort, and country. We interact educational level with country and birth cohort
to produce educational gradients for each national setting and measure change
in these gradients over time. The models are then used to generate predicted
probabilities, associated standard errors, and prediction intervals. Because edu-
cational gradients are unlikely to be linear, we assess gradients based on a signif-
icant difference between proportions using a two-tailed t-test.
Relative Contribution of Education and Country
Our second research question assesses the relative contribution of individual-
level education and country to the probability of falling in a given latent class.
The multinomial logistic regression model can be used to predict the probability
of class membership; however, because education, cohort, and country are inter-
acted with each other, the resulting complexity of the beta coefﬁcients makes it
difﬁcult to assess whether education or country is the largest contributor to vari-
ation in predicted probabilities. While we could incorporate a multilevel model-
ing strategy, with individual-level effects (education) nested within context
(country), this method is unsuitable. First, the speciﬁcation of country as a ran-
dom effect is methodologically questionable, because the multilevel model
assumes that higher-level units are exchangeable, which our countries are not
(Hox, van de Schoot, and Matthijsse 2012). In addition, the number of countries
in our dataset is too low for an interpretation of the random component (Hox,
van de Schoot, and Matthijsse 2012; Bryan and Jenkins 2016). Second, since
our analysis does not include macro-level data, there is no advantage to using a
multilevel model. Third, the speciﬁcation of education as a ﬁxed coefﬁcient and
country as a random effect in a multilevel model means that it is difﬁcult to
make direct comparisons between the two.
We therefore perform a series of ANOVA tests to determine which factor bet-
ter explains variability in class membership. A higher proportion of variance
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(deﬁned as partial sum of squares as a proportion of total sum of squares)
explained by a factor in the ANOVA indicates a greater contribution to varia-
tion in predicted probabilities. ANOVAs are performed on the predicted prob-
abilities of class membership for each latent class generated from the predictive
model described in Equation 2. ANOVA tests make the assumption that the
response variable is normally distributed; thus, we transform the predicted
probabilities (which are non-normal).10 We perform the analysis by birth
cohort to detect whether there is a change in the contribution of an individual’s
education or country to the latent class, although we do not perform formal
tests to determine whether the change over time is signiﬁcant.
Results
Education and Partnership Patterns
As discussed above, the ﬁrst aim is to determine whether the eight latent classes
are signiﬁcantly associated with an individual’s level of education. We run multi-
nomial models with the eight classes as the dependent variable and education,
country, and cohort as predictor variables. Tables 2a and 2b show the predicted
probability of falling into each latent class by education, country, and cohort.
The shaded results indicate a signiﬁcant difference between high and medium or
low and medium education (.05 level based on a two-tailed t-test). Light gray
indicates that the educational gradient is negative; black indicates the educa-
tional gradient is positive; and medium gray indicates the gradient is U-shaped.
Higher education is associated with delayed marriage classes, regardless of
premarital cohabitation. Table 2a shows the probability of falling into the four
stable marriage pattern classes. Immediately we can see that in most countries,
the two early marriage patterns (classes 1 and 3) are dominated by light gray
squares that indicate a negative educational gradient, while the two later mar-
riage patterns (classes 2 and 4) are dominated by black squares that indicate a
positive educational gradient. Note, however, that the negative educational gra-
dient is sometimes associated with a signiﬁcant difference between the higher
and medium educated, and sometimes between medium and low. In addition,
the results are not completely consistent across all countries; some countries
show a U-shaped educational gradient, and some have a positive educational
gradient for the early marriage class, due to the least educated being in the
cohabitation or dissolution classes. Despite these nuances, the results show that
higher education is related to the postponement of marriage.
We also ﬁnd that the relationship between education and marriage timing
holds regardless of whether the marriage was preceded by cohabitation; in most
countries, the least educated have earlier marriage patterns than the more edu-
cated, even when they experience premarital cohabitation. The educational gra-
dient for delayed marriage preceded by cohabitation is overwhelmingly positive,
with the exception of Estonia. The prevalence of this pattern is increasing across
cohorts in every country, reﬂecting the popularity of premarital cohabitation
and the delay of marriage, but not the rejection of marriage. And while this class
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Table 2a. The Predicted Probability of Women Aged 15–45 Ending Up in Each Class by Country, Cohort, and Educational Level, Classes 1–4
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4
Early marriage Delayed marriage
Early marriage with premarital
cohabitation
Delayed marriage with
premarital cohabitation
1945–54 1955–64 1965–74 1945–54 1955–64 1965–74 1945–54 1955–64 1965–74 1945–54 1955–64 1965–74
Austria High 0.16 0.05 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.36 0.38
Medium 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.05 0.33 0.25 0.18 0.24
Low 0.16 0.22 0.13 0.08 0.42 0.26 0.00 0.14
Belgium High 0.29 0.19 0.09 0.33 0.30 0.18 0.13 0.12 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.26
Medium 0.44 0.48 0.22 0.22 0.17 0.09 0.13 0.13 0.20 0.63 0.02 0.15
Low 0.56 0.37 0.26 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.14 0.17 0.04 0.08 0.12
Bulgaria High 0.35 0.40 0.32 0.40 0.25 0.23 0.09 0.14 0.19 0.04 0.09 0.12
Medium 0.56 0.56 0.53 0.20 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.19 0.18 0.03 0.04 0.04
Low 0.56 0.41 0.36 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.25 0.33 0.34 0.02 0.04 0.03
Estonia High 0.30 0.29 0.16 0.29 0.17 0.07 0.09 0.16 0.19 0.08 0.10 0.13
Medium 0.36 0.28 0.20 0.14 0.06 0.03 0.13 0.16 0.20 0.09 0.10 0.07
Low 0.27 0.16 0.14 0.11 0.07 0.00 0.18 0.16 0.26 0.08 0.07 0.07
France High 0.26 0.18 0.03 0.25 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.23 0.34
Medium 0.51 0.31 0.09 0.17 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.15 0.23 0.05 0.13 0.22
Low 0.59 0.32 0.18 0.14 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.17 0.17 0.03 0.09 0.10
Italy High 0.13 0.09 0.03 0.71 0.60 0.61 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.08
Medium 0.39 0.35 0.19 0.51 0.51 0.59 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.06
Low 0.63 0.60 0.43 0.33 0.29 0.39 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.04
Lithuania High 0.31 0.29 0.30 0.43 0.36 0.29 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.06
Medium 0.43 0.38 0.44 0.29 0.22 0.17 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.03
Low 0.45 0.42 0.32 0.24 0.17 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00
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NL High 0.33 0.13 0.04 0.25 0.18 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.14 0.31 0.39
Medium 0.47 0.33 0.11 0.24 0.14 0.09 0.04 0.18 0.16 0.09 0.17 0.32
Low 0.57 0.45 0.18 0.22 0.10 0.11 0.03 0.15 0.20 0.04 0.11 0.18
Norway High 0.28 0.14 0.05 0.24 0.12 0.08 0.10 0.15 0.12 0.14 0.28 0.33
Medium 0.41 0.16 0.08 0.17 0.08 0.02 0.13 0.20 0.21 0.10 0.20 0.21
Low 0.41 0.16 0.03 0.11 0.06 0.05 0.15 0.28 0.19 0.08 0.11 0.20
Poland High 0.30 0.46 0.05 0.05
Medium 0.50 0.27 0.03 0.04
Low 0.61 0.18 0.04 0.02
Romania High 0.22 0.28 0.28 0.57 0.54 0.41 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.09
Medium 0.53 0.55 0.57 0.28 0.21 0.18 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.03
Low 0.68 0.57 0.61 0.12 0.13 0.05 0.07 0.13 0.14 0.02 0.03 0.03
Russia High 0.32 0.33 0.31 0.27 0.23 0.14 0.04 0.05 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.07
Medium 0.42 0.42 0.40 0.14 0.13 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.04 0.05
Low 0.43 0.30 0.36 0.10 0.15 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.22 0.06 0.03 0.00
Spain High 0.24 0.14 0.05 0.56 0.52 0.47 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.09 0.12
Medium 0.36 0.37 0.21 0.42 0.40 0.47 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.07
Low 0.45 0.52 0.32 0.43 0.31 0.35 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.05
UK High 0.43 0.23 0.07 0.22 0.16 0.13 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.15 0.25
Medium 0.53 0.34 0.11 0.19 0.11 0.08 0.02 0.07 0.12 0.05 0.11 0.21
Low 0.51 0.31 0.07 0.12 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.07
USA High 0.31 0.23 0.12 0.19 0.25 0.23 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.19
Medium 0.41 0.33 0.14 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.14
Low 0.34 0.25 0.17 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.04 0.07 0.08
Note: Bold ﬁgures indicate differences between educational levels that are signiﬁcant at the .05 level (two-tailed t-test). Black indicates a positive educational gradient; light
gray indicates a negative educational gradient; dark gray indicates a U-shaped educational gradient; and white indicates no gradient.
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Table 2b. The Predicted Probability of Women Aged 15–45 Being in Each Class by Country, Cohort, and Educational Level, Classes 5–8
Class 5 Class 6 Class 7 Class 8
Delayed or no union formation
Marital dissolution, limited
repartnering
Union dissolution, some
repartnering Cohabitation
1945–54 1955–64 1965–74 1945–54 1955–64 1965–74 1945–54 1955–64 1965–74 1945–54 1955–64 1965–74
Austria High 0.16 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.17
Medium 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.15
Low 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.11 0.06 0.10
Belgium High 0.09 0.14 0.14 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.05 0.15
Medium 0.08 0.09 0.13 0.24 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.11 0.00 0.04 0.10
Low 0.11 0.19 0.17 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.10
Bulgaria High 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03
Medium 0.03 0.24 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.05
Low 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.15
Estonia High 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.13 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.02 0.05 0.22
Medium 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.15 0.15 0.09 0.07 0.12 0.12 0.03 0.11 0.26
Low 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.17 0.16 0.01 0.08 0.18 0.19 0.11 0.18 0.31
France High 0.12 0.14 0.09 0.08 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.13 0.25
Medium 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.11 0.23
Low 0.08 0.09 0.13 0.09 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.24
Italy High 0.09 0.20 0.22 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03
Medium 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.26
Low 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
Lithuania High 0.07 0.10 0.03 0.14 0.20 0.16 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.03
Medium 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.14 0.23 0.18 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.03
Low 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.16 0.17 0.29 0.01 0.17 0.19 0.03 0.00 0.10
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NL High 0.04 0.11 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.23
Medium 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.20
Low 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.01 0.05 0.16
Norway High 0.10 0.08 0.11 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.03 0.10 0.19
Medium 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.14 0.01 0.12 0.25
Low 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.11 0.12 0.03 0.12 0.28
Poland High 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.02
Medium 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.03
Low 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.03
Romania High 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01
Medium 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02
Low 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.08
Russia High 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.13 0.19 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.13 0.02 0.03 0.10
Medium 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.15 0.17 0.14 0.07 0.06 0.12 0.04 0.04 0.08
Low 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.24 0.11 0.06 0.12 0.17 0.00 0.12 0.11
Spain High 0.05 0.13 0.22 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.07
Medium 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.06
Low 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.08
UK High 0.09 0.12 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.10 0.01 0.03 0.16
Medium 0.05 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.17 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.11 0.00 0.04 0.17
Low 0.07 0.12 0.27 0.16 0.19 0.05 0.01 0.08 0.18 0.01 0.04 0.20
USA High 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.14 0.11 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.16 0.02 0.03 0.05
Medium 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.19 0.19 0.11 0.09 0.17 0.24 0.04 0.06 0.11
Low 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.18 0.13 0.11 0.16 0.23 0.23 0.08 0.11 0.18
Note: Bold ﬁgures indicate differences between educational levels that are signiﬁcant at the .05 level (two-tailed t-test). Black indicates a positive educational gradient; light
gray indicates a negative educational gradient; dark gray indicates a U-shaped educational gradient; and white indicates no gradient.
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is becoming increasingly popular for all groups, it is becoming even more so for
the highly educated. Thus, education consistently shapes the educational gradi-
ent of the timing of marriage, regardless of whether it was preceded by
cohabitation.
The separation and cohabitation classes show an inconsistent educational
gradient across countries. Table 2b presents the association between education
and partnership patterns that are not centered on long-term stable marriage
(classes 5–8). The results for these classes are much more mixed, with inconsis-
tent relationships and very few common patterns across countries. Class 5,
which represents delayed partnership formation and remaining never partnered
until age 45, has a mix of positive and negative gradients. Italy and Spain stand
out as having a high probability of falling into class 5 and strong positive
educational gradients, due to general delayed union formation and marriage
(Castro-Martin, Domínguez-Folgueras, and Martín-García 2008). The positive
educational gradient has emerged more recently in Austria, Lithuania, the
Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Russia, and Spain. Cohorts in some countries,
however, have no educational gradient or a U-shaped gradient, as in Bulgaria
and the United States. In the UK, the least educated in the youngest cohort have
a particularly high probability of falling into class 5, perhaps because of the low
rates of forming co-residential unions.
Results for the separation classes (classes 6 and 7) are also mixed. In most
countries, if the gradient is signiﬁcant it is usually negative, with the exception of
Estonia. Lithuania and Russia have positive gradients for earlier cohorts, but
they too have negative gradients for later cohorts. Italy has a consistently posi-
tive educational gradient for class 7, which corroborates previous evidence that
the emergence of divorce in Italy has been associated with higher education,
although note that the predicted probability for this class is very small. The class
representing cohabitation (class 8) also has inconsistent educational gradients.
Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Russia had positive gradients in the
earliest birth cohorts, supporting studies that long-term cohabitation emerged
among the most highly educated, especially in the Low Countries and France.
However, only Austria has a positive educational gradient for the youngest
cohort. In Bulgaria, Lithuania, Romania, and the United States, the educational
gradient for the most recent cohort is negative. Note that the educational gradi-
ent for long-term cohabitation is consistently negative in the United States, sup-
porting other ﬁndings (Kennedy and Bumpass 2008).
Divergence by Education for Marriage and Separation?
Taken as a whole, table 2a indicates that women with lower education have a
signiﬁcantly higher probability of falling in the earlier marriage classes (classes 1
and 3), while highly educated women are more likely to be in later marriage clas-
ses (2 and 4). However, it is difﬁcult to know from table 2a whether more or less
educated women are more likely to enter and stay in stable marriages through-
out the reproductive ages, as discussed in the theoretical framework. In addition,
it is difﬁcult to know from 2b whether women with higher education are
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diverging from women with lower education with respect to separation after
either cohabitation or marriage. In order to answer these questions, we also show
table 3, which combines the results from classes 1–4 and classes 6–7 and speciﬁ-
cally looks for differences between high and low education.
Table 3 shows that throughout much of Western and Northern Europe and
the United States, the educational gradient for staying in marriage throughout
the reproductive period is signiﬁcantly positive, supporting the recent ﬁndings
that marriage is now more likely for the highly educated. This is the case in the
latest cohorts in France, Lithuania, Norway, the UK, and the United States.
Nonetheless, there is no signiﬁcant relationship between education and staying
in marriage in Central and Eastern European countries. In some countries, such
as Poland and Romania, the lack of relationship is probably due to a high
probability of all women entering and staying in marriage, while in Russia,
women are more likely to be in classes with union dissolution, and in Estonia,
women are more likely to be in long-term cohabitation. On the other hand, in
Southern Europe, the gradient for the marriage class tends to be negative, pri-
marily because the most highly educated delay union formation until their late
30s and early 40s, as represented by class 5.
However, for the separation classes, when the educational gradient is signiﬁ-
cant, it is consistently negative: in the most recent cohorts in Austria, France,
Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and the United States, the lower edu-
cated have a signiﬁcantly higher probability of falling into a marital dissolution
or separation class than the higher educated. These results might suggest that the
higher and lower educated have signiﬁcantly different partnership trajectories.
However, only France, Lithuania, and the United States show a positive gradient
for the marriage classes and a negative gradient for the separation classes, indi-
cating that the relationship is not uniform within countries. Hence, while the
results for the United States, France, and Lithuania indicate that patterns of
union formation and dissolution appear to be diverging by education, this trend
does not seem to be occurring to the same degree in the other countries.
Country Context and Individual’s Education
We then turn to our second research question, which uses ANOVA to assess the
relative importance of micro-level education and macro-level country context
for each latent class by cohort (table 4). Each analysis presents the relative share
of the variation in the predicted probabilities for that class explained by educa-
tion and country, as well as the proportion remaining unexplained.
In the latent class for early, direct marriage (class 1), education was initially
very important—it explained almost half of the variation in predicted probabili-
ties for the 1945–54 cohort. In later cohorts, however, the relative importance
of education declined to explain only about 10 percent of the variation in pre-
dicted probabilities. In contrast, cross-national variation increased in importance
from explaining just under a quarter of the variation in the 1945–54 cohorts to
nearly 80 percent in the 1965–74 cohorts. The percent of unexplained variance
also declined across the cohorts, indicating that education and country context
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Table 3. The Combined Predicted Probability of Women Aged 15–45 Being in Classes 1–4
and 6–7, by Country, Cohort, and High versus Low Education
Classes 1–4 Classes 6 and 7
Marriage, with and without
premarital cohabitation and
infrequent separation before 45
Union dissolution followed by
some repartnering into
cohabitation or marriage
1945–54 1955–64 1965–74 1945–54 1955–64 1965–74
Austria High 0.72 0.63 0.04 0.09
Low 0.71 0.70 0.16 0.17
Belgium High 0.85 0.72 0.61 0.04 0.09 0.10
Low 0.83 0.69 0.64 0.03 0.08 0.09
Bulgaria High 0.90 0.88 0.86 0.03 0.08 0.06
Low 0.89 0.83 0.75 0.08 0.07 0.09
Estonia High 0.76 0.72 0.55 0.17 0.19 0.16
Low 0.64 0.46 0.47 0.24 0.34 0.21
France High 0.70 0.63 0.60 0.11 0.10 0.06
Low 0.79 0.68 0.50 0.11 0.15 0.13
Lithuania High 0.76 0.69 0.71 0.15 0.22 0.23
Low 0.75 0.63 0.42 0.18 0.33 0.48
Italy High 0.87 0.77 0.73 0.03 0.02 0.03
Low 0.97 0.94 0.91 0.00 0.01 0.02
NL High 0.81 0.70 0.62 0.11 0.10 0.06
Low 0.86 0.81 0.68 0.12 0.12 0.12
Norway High 0.76 0.69 0.59 0.11 0.13 0.11
Low 0.75 0.61 0.48 0.14 0.17 0.13
Poland High 0.86 0.05
Low 0.84 0.10
Romania High 0.87 0.86 0.83 0.08 0.10 0.09
Low 0.89 0.86 0.83 0.07 0.08 0.07
Russia High 0.69 0.68 0.62 0.21 0.25 0.23
Low 0.76 0.52 0.61 0.14 0.36 0.28
Spain High 0.90 0.78 0.68 0.04 0.06 0.03
Low 0.94 0.89 0.77 0.03 0.06 0.08
UK High 0.74 0.63 0.54 0.15 0.21 0.16
Low 0.75 0.57 0.30 0.18 0.27 0.23
USA High 0.65 0.68 0.61 0.26 0.23 0.25
Low 0.53 0.48 0.42 0.34 0.36 0.34
Note: Bold ﬁgures indicate differences between educational levels that are signiﬁcant at
the .05 level (two-tailed t-test). Black indicates a positive educational gradient; gray indicates
a negative educational gradient; and white indicates no signiﬁcant gradient.
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began to explain a greater proportion of the variance over time. Although our
tests cannot show whether the change across cohorts is signiﬁcant, the magni-
tude of the difference suggests that in the earliest birth cohorts, education was a
more dominant factor than country context. Then, as countries started to experi-
ence increases in educational attainment and delays in marriage at different
rates, country setting became more important.
The pattern is similar in the later direct marriage class (class 2), except that
the role of education was less pronounced over the three cohorts and cross-
national variation was always dominant. In class 3, the class representing early
marriage preceded by cohabitation, country was the dominant factor for all
cohorts. However, in this class, the role of education was minimal: education
explained less than 8 percent of the variation in all cohorts and between 9 and
Table 4. Results from ANOVA of Education, Country, and Unexplained Variance, by Cohort
(logit link)
Education Country Residual
Class 1: Early, direct, and stable marriage 1945–54 0.48 0.25 0.27
1955–64 0.29 0.47 0.23
1965–74 0.11 0.78 0.11
Class 2: Later, direct, and stable marriage 1945–54 0.28 0.64 0.08
1955–64 0.19 0.74 0.07
1965–74 0.08 0.88 0.05
Class 3: Early marriage preceded by
cohabitation
1945–54 0.06 0.83 0.11
1955–64 0.05 0.88 0.07
1965–74 0.09 0.82 0.09
Class 4: Postponed marriage, preceded by
cohabitation
1945–54 0.20 0.69 0.11
1955–64 0.17 0.73 0.10
1965–74 0.12 0.83 0.05
Class 5: Late union formation/Never
partnering
1945–54 0.22 0.57 0.21
1955–64 0.17 0.63 0.20
1965–74 0.16 0.66 0.18
Class 6: Marital dissolution, limited
repartnering
1945–54 0.02 0.96 0.03
1955–64 0.02 0.96 0.02
1965–74 0.02 0.95 0.03
Class 7: Varied dissolving union types 1945–54 0.01 0.93 0.06
1955–64 0.02 0.93 0.06
1965–74 0.02 0.94 0.04
Class 8: Cohabitation 1945–54 0.05 0.64 0.31
1955–64 0.04 0.79 0.18
1965–74 0.02 0.89 0.09
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11 percent of the variance was left unexplained. In contrast, educational attain-
ment explained a greater proportion of the variance in class 4, which represents
postponed marriage preceded by cohabitation. However, the proportion
explained by education declined, and as in the other classes, country became
increasingly important. Again, education and country explained nearly all of the
variation, with only 5 percent left unexplained for the latest cohort.
In class 5, representing late union formation and never partnering, education
initially accounted for roughly one-quarter of the total variation in predicted
probabilities. Thereafter, the relative importance of education declined, while
the proportion of variance explained by country increased. Note that the pro-
portion of variance explained by education in the 1965–74 birth cohorts was
higher in class 5 than in any other class. Therefore, although the relative impor-
tance of education compared to national setting declined (as for classes 1, 2,
and 4), education was still relatively important for delayed union formation.
Also, this class had a high proportion of unexplained variance, suggesting that
factors other than country and education were important.
For classes 6 and 7, which characterize union dissolution patterns, education
is of limited importance in all cohorts, accounting for less than 2 percent of vari-
ance. This supports the above ﬁnding that marital dissolution and separation
patterns are less likely to be associated with educational attainment, and that
country context is far more important for explaining separation. Note as well
that country context is so important for predicting marital dissolution or separa-
tion patterns that the proportion of unexplained variance is strikingly low—less
than 6 percent for both classes. In class 8 (long-term cohabitation), education is
only marginally important, accounting for less than 5 percent of variation in the
predicted probability. In contrast, the proportion of variance explained by coun-
try increased by roughly 20 percentage points over the cohorts. While unex-
plained variance was relatively high in the earlier cohorts, less than 10 percent
of variation was unexplained for the 1965–74 cohort. These results indicate that
educational level is only marginally inﬂuential in explaining long-term cohabit-
ing behavior, but country setting is becoming increasingly important.
Discussion
Recent studies in the United States and Europe have argued that the more highly
educated are increasingly following a trajectory characterized by delayed but
stable marriage, while the least educated are following a trajectory including
cohabitation and union instability (Isen and Stevenson 2010; Cherlin 2009;
Martin 2006; Perelli-Harris et al. 2010; McLanahan 2004). No study, however,
has examined this argument with holistic partnership trajectories between ages
15 and 45 using cohabitation and marriage histories. Our approach allows us to
examine the complexity of relationship transitions across the lifecourse by simul-
taneously investigating the timing and type of partnership formation, as well as
union dissolution and repartnering (see Perelli-Harris and Lyons-Amos 2015).
Given that partnership transitions are often interdependent, tracing partnership
status throughout adulthood allows us to better understand how education is
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related to a range of processes rather than just a single event. The results from
our ﬁrst analyses provide some support for the diverging trajectories argument:
higher education is important for understanding the timing and prevalence of
stable marriage patterns in the majority of our studied countries, and in some
countries partnership patterns with union dissolution were associated with
lower education. However, the results from the second analysis reveal that a
woman’s education is less relevant for predicting partnership patterns than the
country in which she is living, which suggests that context may be more impor-
tant than individual-level characteristics.
Previous studies have indicated that union formation behaviors have been
diverging across Europe and the United States (Billari and Liefbroer 2010), sug-
gesting that social and cultural change has been occurring at different rates and
producing diverse patterns of union formation. Here, we ﬁnd that macro-level
country context explains more of the variance in predicted probabilities than
individual-level education and is an excellent predictor of partnership patterns
as a whole. While education may be important for understanding the timing of
marriage or the delay of union formation at the individual level, it is not the
main predictor of partnership patterns in any latent class except the early mar-
riage class. In fact, the importance of country context appears to be increasing
over time, suggesting a growing inﬂuence of social, cultural, and economic fac-
tors on women’s partnership behavior. This increasing divergence is occurring
despite the expansion of educational attainment in all countries, an expansion
that produces greater within-country heterogeneity and should provide a greater
opportunity for education to become more inﬂuential as lower education
becomes more selective of certain groups. Thus, our ﬁndings show that even
though women’s education has increased everywhere and should be producing
greater differentials in partnership behavior, country of residence has become
more important for characterizing partnership behavior.
Note, however, that it is impossible to completely disentangle the effect of edu-
cation on the individual level from macro-level country context; country context
does reﬂect the aggregate level of education in a country. The increase in educa-
tion at the macro level may be driving social and cultural change and producing
differences in partnership formation across countries. For example, the greater
percent of women who attained higher education in the Scandinavian countries
may be leading to a faster pace of delayed marriage and increased cohabitation
than in Eastern European countries, where higher education has not expanded as
quickly. Nonetheless, our results indicate that the within-country variation in edu-
cation is less important for partnership patterns than the between-country varia-
tion of country context as a whole. For example, the ﬁndings suggest that the
partnership pattern of a highly educated Norwegian is more similar to that of a
less educated Norwegian than a highly educated Romanian.
This is not say, however, that an individual’s level of education is not impor-
tant for understanding union formation, particularly the timing of marriage.
Overall, the two early marriage classes were dominated by negative educational
gradients, while the two later marriage classes were dominated by positive
gradients, suggesting that highly educated women are more likely to delay
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marriage in pursuit of other opportunities, such as a career, or may be able to
prolong the spousal search process due to their higher economic potential
(Oppenheimer 1997). In addition, as higher education has expanded, the pro-
portion of women in the early marriage classes has declined, with a greater pro-
portion shifting to the later marriage classes, demonstrating how education has
been important for delaying marriage. Cohabiting before marriage did not seem
to change this relationship: latent classes with premarital cohabitation and early
marriage usually had negative gradients, while those with premarital cohabita-
tion and later marriage had positive gradients. Thus, premarital cohabitation is
relatively inconsequential for understanding the educational gradient of partner-
ship formation compared to the stronger and more consistent association
between education and the timing of marriage.
In addition, education does seem to be associated with patterns of marital sta-
bility and union dissolution in some countries, particularly for more recent
cohorts. The United States stands out as having a clear long-term divergence in
union formation patterns by education; the stable marriage classes have positive
educational gradients for all cohorts, while the union dissolution classes have
negative educational gradients for all cohorts. The long-term cohabitation class
is also characterized by a persistent negative educational gradient. However, the
evidence for a divergence in partnership trajectories in Europe is comparatively
weak. While in most of Northern and Western Europe, women with higher edu-
cation have a higher probability of experiencing stable marriage, this association
has only recently emerged and is not always consistent. Countries in Central and
Eastern Europe tend to have no signiﬁcant relationship between education and
stable marriage classes, most likely because marriage is relatively young and uni-
versal, especially in Russia, Poland, and Romania (Hoem et al. 2010). In Italy
and Spain, however, the stable marriage classes have a negative educational gra-
dient, due to highly educated women having a higher probability of falling into
the delayed partnership class. The educational gradient for the union dissolution
classes is either negative or insigniﬁcant and has been for all cohorts. These
results suggest that when looking at union trajectories as a whole, the educa-
tional gradient of union dissolution has not reversed over time, contradicting
studies that examine only the transition to divorce (Härkönen and Dronkers
2006; Matysiak, Styrc, and Vignoli 2013).
Note that this study has several limitations. The reporting of cohabiting rela-
tionships may be subject to recall error, and each survey is subject to limitations
that may bias results (see Perelli-Harris, Kreyenfeld, and Kubisch 2010). The
number and form of the latent classes are sensitive to the speciﬁc countries and
cohorts included, and the US 1951–54 cohort is not directly comparable to the
1945–54 cohorts in other countries. Due to truncation, the 1965–74 cohort
would not have reached age 45, depending on the year of the survey in each
country. This will have reduced the exposure time for these women, possibly
underestimating their prevalence in the union dissolution classes, or even
delayed marriage classes, and it could also have implications for the educational
gradient. These issues were discussed extensively and tested with sensitivity anal-
yses in Perelli-Harris and Lyons-Amos (2015). Finally, the analyses are only
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descriptive and cannot establish a causal relationship between education and
partnership trajectories. Despite these shortcomings, however, we feel that the
beneﬁts of comparing latent classes across countries and examining the youngest
cohort with the available data outweigh these limitations.
Indeed, by including the youngest cohorts, we can see how country context is
becoming more relevant across cohorts, as shown in the second analysis.
Relative to individual-level education, country increasingly explains more of the
variance in partnership classes over time, or at least does not change substan-
tially. Thus, the increasing variation between countries has become more impor-
tant for understanding holistic patterns of union formation and dissolution.
However, the reason for the divergence in partnership behavior may be because
some countries are at the forefront of new developments, while others are lag-
ging behind (Billari and Liefbroer 2010; Lesthaeghe 2010). As cohabitation and
union dissolution increase in all countries, Europe and the United States may
eventually experience greater convergence. On the other hand, with the increas-
ing de-standardization of the lifecourse, convergence may become less likely, as
each country takes its own unique path. Indeed, qualitative research has sug-
gested that participants in countries across Europe interpret the meaning of
cohabitation in different ways (Perelli-Harris et al. 2014). Thus, in order to
better understand these developments, it is important not only to search for com-
mon explanations for changes in partnership, but also to examine context-
speciﬁc factors. Only in-depth investigation into historical, cultural, economic,
and policy developments will lead to a better understanding of how and why
partnership patterns are changing.
Notes
1. Sequence analysis extracts partnership histories in a similar way but requires assump-
tions about missing data and may produce clusters not supported by the data.
2. Although person-months may be more accurate, computational limitations require
the use of yearly intervals. However, robustness tests in individual countries
produced similar results.
3. Women are considered single at time of separation, not divorce. Widows were coded
as single after being in a previous union.
4. Other speciﬁcations of the underlying distribution did not substantially alter the
results.
5. Growth mixture models with random coefﬁcients did not converge with our data.
6. Although the bootstrap likelihood ratio test is better for testing the number of classes
due to a lower false positive rate (Nylund, Asparouhov, and Muthén 1997), the test
is too computationally intense.
7. The number of classes is sensitive to model speciﬁcation; for example, the number of
countries can change the number of classes. Hence, the eight latent classes are speciﬁc
to this model speciﬁcation, and we urge caution in interpreting this exact number
(Warren et al. 2014).
8. We tried adding a trajectory for second- and higher-order unions, but only three clas-
ses emerged, indicating a loss of diversity. Therefore, we speciﬁed that respondents
reenter cohabitation or marriage after separation.
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9. We would prefer to estimate the model based on the pseudo-class method using
Mplus (Wang, Brown, and Bandeen-Roche 2005; Nylund, Asparouhov, and
Muthén 2007), but this approach was too computationally intensive.
10. We tested ANOVA results with both logit and square-root arcsine links, but due to
similar results, we only present logit links.
About the Authors
Brienna Perelli-Harris is Associate Professor of Demography at the University of
Southampton. She recently completed a European Research Council starting
grant to study the increase in childbearing within cohabitation in industrialized
countries (www.nonmarital.org). Working with researchers across Europe, the
United States, and Australia, she uses quantitative and qualitative methods to
explore the development of family formation behaviors. She recently edited a
Special Collection in Demographic Research, “Focus on Partnerships,” which
employed focus groups in nine countries.
Mark Lyons-Amos is an LSE Fellow in Population Health at the Department
of Social Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science. His research
interests revolve around the application of longitudinal data analytic techniques
to demographic data, modeling the processes surrounding family formation, and
the consequent outcomes.
References
Becker, Gary. 1991. A Treatise on the Family. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Bernhardt, Eva, Turid Noack, and Torkild Hovde Lyngstad. 2008. “Shared Housework in Norway and
Sweden: Advancing the Gender Revolution.” Journal of European Social Policy 18(3):275–88.
Billari, Francesco C., and Aat C. Liefbroer. 2010. “Towards a New Pattern of Transition to Adulthood?”
Advances in Life Course Research 15(2–3):59–75.
Bryan, Mark L., and Stephen P. Jenkins. 2016. “Multilevel modelling of country effects: a cautionary
tale.” European Sociological Review 32(1):3–22.
Carlson, Marcia, and Paula England. 2011. Social Class and Changing Families in an Unequal America.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Castro-Martín, Teresa, Marta Domínguez-Folgueras, and Teresa Martín-García. 2008. “Not Truly
Partnerless: Non-Residential Partnerships and Retreat from Marriage in Spain.” Demographic
Research 18(16):443–68.
Cherlin, Andrew. 2009. The Marriage-Go-Round: The State of Marriage and the Family in America Today.
New York: Knopf.
Coale, Ansley J., and S. Cotts Watkins. 1986. The Decline of Fertility in Europe: The Revised Proceedings
of a Conference on the Princeton Fertility Project. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Coppola, Lucia. 2004. “Education and Union Formation as Simultaneous in Italy and Spain.” European
Journal of Population/Revue européenne de Démographie 20(3):219–50.
Dariotis, Jacinda K., Joseph H. Pleck, Nan M. Astone, and Freya L. Sonenstein. 2011. “Pathways of Early
Fatherhood, Marriage, and Employment: A Latent Class Growth Analysis.” Demography 48(2):593–623.
Edin, Kathryn, and Maria Kefalas. 2005. Promises I Can Keep: Why Poor Women Put Motherhood before
Marriage. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
278 Social Forces 95(1)
Elzinga, Cees and Aart Liefbroer. 2007. "De-Standardization of Family-Life Trajectories of Young Adults: A
Cross-National Comparison Using Sequence Analysis." European Journal of Population 23(3):225–50.
Galezewska, Paulina, Brienna Perelli-Harris, and Ann Berrington. 2013. “Repartnering after Divorce and
Separation in Europe and the United States.” In Paper presented at the Divorce Conference, 26-28
Sep 2013, Oxford.
Gibson-Davis, Christina M. 2007. "Expectations and the Economic Bar to Marriage among Low Income
Couples." pp. 84–103 in Unmarried Couples with Children, edited by Paula England, and Kathryn Edin.
Russell Sage Foundation.
Goldstein, Josh R., and Catherine T. Kenney. 2001. “Marriage Delayed or Marriage Forgone? New Cohort
Forecasts of First Marriage for US Women.” American Sociological Review 66:506–19.
Härkönen, Juho, and Jaap Dronkers. 2006. “Stability and Change in the Educational Gradient of Divorce:
A Comparison of Seventeen Countries.” European Sociological Review 22(5):501–17.
Heard, Genevieve. 2011. “Socioeconomic Marriage Differentials in Australia and New Zealand.”
Population and Development Review 37(1):125–60.
Heuveline, Patrick, Jeffrey M. Timberlake, and Frank F. Furstenberg Jr. 2003. “Shifting Childrearing to
Single Mothers: Results from 17 Western Countries.” Population and Development Review
29(1):47–71.
Hoem, Jan M., Giuseppe Gabrielli, Aiva Jasilioniene, Dora Kostova, and Anna Matysiak. 2010. “Levels of
Recent Union Formation: Six European Countries Compared.” Demographic Research 22(9):199–210.
Hox, Joop, Rens van de Schoot, and Suzette Matthijsse. 2012. “How Few Countries Will Do?
Comparative Survey Analysis from a Bayesian Perspective.” Survey Research Methods 6:87–93.
ISCED. 1997. International Standard Classiﬁcation of Education «http://www.unesco.org/education/
information/nfsunesco/doc/isced_1997.htm»
Isen, Adam, and Betsey Stevenson. 2010. “Women’s Education and Family Behavior: Trends in Marriage,
Divorce, and Fertility.” National Bureau of Economic Research.
Kalmijn, Matthijs. 2007. “Explaining Cross-National Differences in Marriage, Cohabitation, and Divorce in
Europe, 1990–2000.” Population Studies 61(3):243–63.
______. 2011. “The Inﬂuence of Men’s Income and Employment on Marriage and Cohabitation: Testing
Oppenheimer’s Theory in Europe.” European Journal of Population/Revue européenne de Démographie
27(3):269–93.
______. 2013. “The Educational Gradient in Marriage: A Comparison of 25 European Countries.”
Demography 50(4):1499–520.
Katus, Kalev, Asta Põldma, Allan Puur, and Luule Sakkeus. 2007. “First Union Formation in Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania: Patterns across Countries and Gender.” Demographic Research 17:247.
Kennedy, Sheela, and L. Bumpass. 2008. “Cohabitation and Children’s Living Arrangements: New
Estimates from the United States.” Demographic Research 19:1663–92.
Klüsener, Sebastian, Brienna Perelli-Harris, and Nora Sánchez Gassen. 2013. “Spatial Aspects of the Rise
of Nonmarital Fertility across Europe since 1960: The Role of States and Regions in Shaping Patterns
of Change.” European Journal of Population 29(2):137–65.
Kneip, Thorsten, and Gerrit Bauer. 2009. “Did Unilateral Divorce Laws Raise Divorce Rates in Western
Europe?” Journal of Marriage and Family 71(3):592–607.
Konietzka, Dirk, and Michaela Kreyenfeld. 2002. “Women’s Employment and Non-Marital Childbearing:
A Comparison between East and West Germany in the 1990s.” Population 57(2):331–58.
Lesthaeghe, Ron. 2010. “The Unfolding Story of the Second Demographic Transition.” Population and
Development Review 36(2):211–51.
Lesthaeghe, Ron, and Karel Neels. 2002. “From the First to the Second Demographic Transition: An
Interpretation of the Spatial Continuity of Demographic Innovation in France, Belgium, and
Switzerland.” European Journal of Population 18(4):325–60.
Partnership Patterns in the United States and across Europe 279
Lichter, Daniel T., Richard N. Turner, and Sharon Sassler. 2010. “National Estimates of the Rise in Serial
Cohabitation.” Social Science Research 39(5):754–65.
Lo, Y., N. R. Mendell, and D. B. Rubin. 2001. “Testing the Number of Components in a Normal Mixture.”
Biometrika 88:767–78.
Martin, Steven P. 2006. “Trends in Marital Dissolution by Women’s Education in the United States.”
Demographic Research 15(20):537–60.
Matysiak, Anna, Marta Styrc, and Daniele Vignoli. 2013. “The Educational Gradient in Marital Disruption:
A Meta-Analysis of European Research Findings.” Population Studies 68(2):197–215.
McLanahan, Sara. 2004. “Diverging Destinies: How Children Are Faring under the Second Demographic
Transition.” Demography 41(4):607–27.
McLanahan, Sara, and Christine Percheski. 2008. “Family Structure and the Reproduction of Inequalities.”
Annual Review of Sociology 34:257–76.
Mikolai, Julia, Brienna Perelli-Harris, and Ann Berrington. 2014. “Partnership Pathways to First Birth and
the Role of Education in Europe and the United States.” In Population Association of America.
Boston.
Mills, Melinda, and Hans Peter Blossfeld. 2005. “Globalization, Uncertainty, and the Early Life Course: A
Theoretical Framework” In Globalization, Uncertainty and Youth in Society, edited by Erik Klijzing et al.
Oxon, ON: Routledge.
Muthén, Linda K., and Bengt O. Muthén. 2011. Mplus User’s Guide. Los Angeles.
Mynarska, Monika, and Laura Bernardi. 2007. “Meanings and Attitudes Attached to Cohabitation in
Poland.” Demographic Research 16(17):519–54.
Neels, Karel, and Brienna Perelli-Harris. 2013. “Heterogeneity in Demographic Change: The Educational
Gradient of New Family Behaviors in Europe and the United States.” In Population Association of
America. New Orleans.
Nylund, Karen L., Tihomir Asparouhov, and Bengt O. Muthén. 2007. “Deciding on the Number of Classes
in Latent Class Analysis and Growth Mixture Modeling: A Monte Carlo Simulation Study.” Structural
Equation Modeling 14(4):535–69.
Oppenheimer, Valerie Kincade. 1988. "A Theory of Marriage Timing." American Journal of Sociology 94
(3):563–91.
Oppenheimer, Valerie K. 1997. “Women’s Employment and the Gain to Marriage: The Specialization and
Trading Model.” Annual Review of Sociology 23:431–53.
______. 2003. “Cohabiting and Marriage during Young Men’s Career-Development Process.”
Demography 40(1):127–49.
Perelli-Harris, Brienna, and Theodore P. Gerber. 2011. “Nonmarital Fertility in Russia: Second
Demographic Transition or Pattern of Disadvantage?” Demography 48(1):317–42.
Perelli-Harris, Brienna, Michaela Kreyenfeld, and Karolin Kubisch. 2010. “Technical Manual for the
Harmonized Histories Database.” MPIDR Working Paper 011.
Perelli-Harris, Brienna, Monika Mynarska, Ann Berrington, Caroline Berghammer, Ann Evans, Olga
Isupova, Renske Keizer, Andreas Klärner, Trude Lappegård and Daniele Vignoli. 2014. "Towards a
New Understanding of Cohabitation: Insights from Focus Group Research across Europe and
Australia." Demographic Research 31(34):1043–78.
Perelli-Harris, Brienna, and Mark Lyons-Amos. 2015. “Changes in Partnership Patterns across the
Lifecourse: An Examination of 14 Countries in Europe and the United States.” Demographic Research
33(6):145–78.
Perelli-Harris, Brienna, and Nora Sánchez Gassen. 2012. “How Similar Are Cohabitation and Marriage?
Legal Approaches to Cohabitation across Western Europe.” Population and Development Review
38(3):435–67.
280 Social Forces 95(1)
Perelli-Harris, Brienna, Wendy Sigle-Rushton, Trude Lappegård, Renske Keizer, Caroline Berghammer,
and Michaela Kreyenfeld. 2010. “The Educational Gradient of Nonmarital Childbearing in Europe.”
Population and Development Review 36(4):775–801.
Reed, Joanna. 2006. “Not Crossing the ‘Extra Line’: How Cohabitors with Children View Their Unions.”
Journal of Marriage and Family 68:1117–31.
Reher, David Sven. 1998. “Family Ties in Western Europe: Persistent Contrasts.” Population and
Development Review 24(2):203–34.
Sánchez Gassen, Nora, and Brienna Perelli-Harris. 2015. “The Increase in Cohabitation and the Role of
Marital Status in Family Policies: A Comparison of 12 European Countries.” Journal of European
Social Policy 25:431–49.
Smock, Pamela J., Wendy D. Manning, and Meredith Porter. 2005. “‘Everything’s There Except Money’:
How Money Shapes Decisions to Marry among Cohabitors.” Journal of Marriage and Family
67(3):680–96.
Sobotka, Tomáš L., and Laurent Toulemon. 2008. “Overview Chapter 4: Changing Family and Partnership
Behavior: Common Trends and Persistent Diversity across Europe.” Demographic Research
19(6):85–138.
Stevenson, Betsey, and Justin Wolfers. 2007. “Marriage and Divorce: Changes and Their Driving Forces.”
Journal of Economic Perspectives 21(2):27–52.
Sweeney, Megan. 2002. “Two Decades of Family Change: The Shifting Economic Foundations of
Marriage.” American Sociological Review 67(1):132–47.
van de Kaa, Dirk. 1987. “Europe’s Second Demographic Transition.” Population Bulletin 42(1):1–59.
Vergauwen, Jorik, Jonas Wood, David De Wachter and Karel Neels. 2015. "Quality of Demographic Data
in GGS Wave 1." Demographic Research 32(24):723–74.
Vignoli, Daniele, and Silvana Salvini. 2014. “Religion and Union Formation Choices in Italy: Catholic
Precepts, Social Pressure, and Tradition.” Demographic Research 31(35):1079–106.
Wang, Chen-Pin, C. Hendricks Brown, and Karen Bandeen-Roche. 2005. “Residual Diagnostics for Growth
Mixture Models: Examining the Impact of a Preventive Intervention on Multiple Trajectories of
Aggressive Behavior.” Journal of the American Statistical Association 100(471):1054–76.
Warren, J.R., Luo, L., Halpern-Manners, A., Raymo, J.M. and Palloni, A., 2015. “Do Different Methods for
Modeling Age-Graded Trajectories Yield Consistent and Valid Results?” American Journal of
Sociology, 120(6), pp. 1809–1856.
Watkins, Susan C. 1991. From Provinces into Nations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Partnership Patterns in the United States and across Europe 281
